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ACCESS VS. FAIRNESS IN NEWSPAPERS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
TORNILLO FOR A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS
I. INTRODUCTION
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,' while not the first deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court to deal with some aspect of
access to newspapers, is, however, the first pronouncement coming from
that bench to deal with the problem of the individual's right to have his
views presented in the printed mass media. In that the issue resolved-
whether the state can compel a private newspaper to publish replies to its
editorial criticism-involves the opposite of the oft-confronted prior re-
straint problem, Tornillo is an important step in fully defining the param-
eters of the constitutional guarantee of a free press. Equally important
may be Tornillo's role as a harbinger of the reconciliation of fairness and
freedom in this branch of the media through government initiative.
This article, will proceed in three sections. The first presents the
history and holdings of Tornillo as a framework within which the prob-
lem of governmental assurance of a balanced, yet free, press will be ex-
amined. The second section will examine the concept of access to the
press. The role of media control will be examined as a factor in inhibit-
ing press responsibility. The second section then traces the legal history
of access, demonstrating how each of the various arguments employed to
promote access has met with strong first amendment resistance. The sec-
tion concludes with an assessment of the effectiveness of access in achiev-
ing a balanced presentation of public issues in the press. The third sec-
tion examines the groundwork Tornillo may have laid for the imposition
of a "Fairness Doctrine" upon newspapers. The Court's concern over
balanced press coverage, the recognition of physical limitations on the
expansion of the press, the role of editorial discretion, and the retreat
from a policy of specifically disclaiming the viability of a newspaper
"Fairness Doctrine" are examined as component parts of that groundwork.
II. SYNOPSIS OF FACTS AND OPINIONS
During 1972, Pat L. Tornillo, Jr., was a candidate for a seat in the
Florida House of Representatives. On September 20 and September 29,
1972, The Miami Herald published editorials critical of Tornillo's candi-
194 S.Ct. 2831 (1974).
2The issue has been tangentially involved in a number of newspaper antitrust cases. E,g.,
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 191 (1969,; Lorain Journal Co, v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See discus.
sion infra agII C.
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dacy.3 Following the publication of the second editorial, Tornillo, pur-
suant to the Florida "right of reply" statute' requested that the news-
paper, at its expense, print verbatim a reply submitted by him. The news-
paper refused to publish the tendered material.
Upon the Herald's refusal to publish the tendered material, Tornillo
filed a civil action in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit
(Dade County) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as puni-
tive damages. Noting that the complaint sought civil enforcement of a
criminal statute, the circuit court pointed out that, absent special circum-
stances, equity would not enjoin the commission of a crime. The court
further found that the statute upon which the action was predicated, §
104.38, was constitutionally infirm in two respects: first, the compulsory
publication requirements constituted a restraint upon free speech and
press, and thus were repugnant to both the Florida constitution and to
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution; second,
the statute was a vague and indefinite criminal provision, and thus denied
due process.5
Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Florida, where the circuit
court's decision holding § 104.38 unconstitutional was reversed in Tor-
nillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.0 Reasoning that freedom of ex-
pression "rests upon the necessity for a fully informed electorate,""- the
court found that the purpose of § 104.38 was to facilitate the presenta-
tion of all sides of a controversy concerning candidates for public office. It
believed that this purpose coincided with the policy of maintaining the
unfettered opportunity for the exchange of political ideas enunciated in
3 The editorials opined that Tornillo's activities as Executive Director of the Classroom
Teacher's As.ociation (CTA), a collective bargaining unit, demonstrated his disregard for law
and the public interest. At the center of the controversy were a 1968 teacher's strike, sup-
posedly prohibited by statute, and allegations of soliciting campaign contributions from CTA
members. The editorials are reprinted at 94 S.Ct. 2831, 2832 n.1 (1974).
4 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (West 1973):
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for
nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance
or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another
free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate im-
mediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place
and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided such re-
ply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Any parson or firm fail-
ing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082 and 775.083 (West Supp. 1973) provide alternative penalties
of no more than one year's imprisonment or a fine of S1,000 for first degree misdemeanors.
u Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 38 Fla. Supp. 80 (Cir. Cr. 1972).
;287 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1973).
"Id. at 81. This premise will be recognized as that advanced by Professor Meiklejohn.
See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
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Neu, York Times Co. r. Sullivan.8 The need for such a statute, the court
stated, was all the more pressing in an age when the presentation of all
facets of public issues "is being jeopardized by the growing concentra-
tion of the ownership of mass media into fewer and fewer hands, re-
sulting ultimately in a form of private censorship.' 0 The court held that
when the means of disseminating opinion fall into the hands of a few, it
is not an abridgment of freedom of the press to require those few to give
access to others in order to present differing points of view. It relied
upon Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 0 to support the assertion that
government may intervene to insure that the media present the multiplic-
ity of opinion on a given subject. The opinion also cited the text and a
footnote to Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.11 as placing the imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court on
such statutes.
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed
and held that the mandatory publication provisions in the statute violated
the guarantee of a free and unabridged press contained in the first amend-
ment and made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. 12
In an opinion joined by five other Justices, Chief Justice Burger conceded
that the concentration of media control in the hands of a few resulted in
such power over the flow of information and ideas that biased and ma-
nipulative reporting had become a very real danger. Nonetheless, it was
pointed out that the Constitution had opted for a free press, not a press
whose fairness was controlled by the government's intervention. Such
intervention would be equally suspect whether it came in the form of a
command to publish or appeared in the guise of a prohibition on publi-
cation, for both encompass a penalty imposed because of content. More-
over, the penalty in this case acted as a double-edged sword: compliance
by publishing the reply exacted a penalty in the form of additional print-
ing costs, composing time and space limitations, while refusal to publish
carried criminal sanctions. The only way to avoid either aspect of the
penalty would have been to refrain from comment on political candidates.
8 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
0 287 So.2d at 82-83.
10 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The constitutionality of the FCC's "Fairness Doctrine" was up-
held in this case, the Court finding that there is no abridgment of first amendment freedoms
when the government requires those who control scarce media resources to make those re-
sources available for the presentation of views opposing those already presented.
11403 U.S. 29, 47 (197 1): "If the states fear that private citizens will not be able to respond
adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of insuring their
ability to respond .... "
Id. at n.15: "Some states have adopted retraction statutes or right of reply statutes,"
12 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S.Ct. 2831 (1.974).
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Thus the statute effectiyely created a chilling effect upon the exercise of
the freedoms protected by the first amendment. Even if the penalty
were not so great as to restrain the exercise of media freedom, concluded
the Chief Justice, the statute would run afoul of the first amendment by
attempting to usurp the function of the editor, which function includes
the authority to decide what will and what will not be published.
The two concurring opinions filed in Tornillo did not take issue with
the Chief Justice's reasoning; indeed, in his opinion,1" Mr. Justice White
readily endorsed editorial discretion as a ratio decidendi. However, both
Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist,14 expressed concern over the effect that Tornillo might have upon
other remedies for defamation. The former feared that Tornillo, com-
bined with the more stringent damages rule laid down in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,' would vitiate a great deal of the law's protection of repu-
tations; the latter two emphasized that they would not want Tornillo
read as making any judgment on the constitutionality of "retraction"
statutes.
II. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
A. Concentration of Media Control
The heart of the access advocates' argument lies in what is seen as a
climate of media control and non-responsiveness fostered by the structure
of the newspaper business today. Two phenomena dominate that mar-
ket in the United States-the "chain" newspaper and the monopoly news-
paper." Both challenge the existence of vigorous and even-handed cov-
erage of events. The former, the daily that is but one of many units in
a network of journals, each carrying the wire reports and syndicated
columns chosen by a central editorial office, is forced into a conformity
of format and ideology dictated by the efficient operation of the chain.
Such uniformity, combined with the fact that that central office may be
13 Id. at 2840.
14 Id.
1.', 94 S.Cr. 2997 (1974). At issue was the libel of a private individual in defendant's mag-
azine. The Court held that first amendment protection did not extend to possible defamation
of a private individual. Thus, such individuals need not prove the New York Times stan-
dard of "actual malice" in order to recover actual damages. However, the "actual malice"
standard must be met in order to recover punitive damages.
2 Recent estimates reveal that half of all dailies, accounting for three-fifths of total daily
and Sunday circulation in the United States, are owned by groups, chains, and conglomerates.
Monopoly newspapers-those receiving no real competition from other dailies in their geo-
graphic market (iz., the "one newspaper town")-predominate; effective competition among
such newspapers exists in only four percent of large U.S. cities. A. Balk, Background Paper,
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE REPORT FOR A NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL, A
FREE AND RESPONSIVE PREsS 18 (1973).
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geographically remote from the community served, results in a press that
is insensitive to the peculiarities and local concerns of its readership. 7
Consequently, complete coverage of local issues is rare. On the other
hand, the monopoly newspaper often errs, not in the passive omission of
opposing views, but in active one-sided coverage; rather than being un-
aware of opposition voices, a monopoly newspaper will ignore them."'
This attitude is all the more threatening because of the single newspaper's
opportunity to influence political decision-making in its dependent home
community:
What a local paper does not print about a local affair does not see gen-
eral print at all. And, having the power to take initiative in report-
ing and enunciation of opinions, it has the extraordinary power to set
the atmosphere and determine the terms of local consideration of public
issues.1 9
While either of these phenomena-the unresponsive and incomplete
reporting of the "chain" newspaper and the over-zealous and biased cov-
erage of the monopoly newspaper-can alone undermine the goal of
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open"20 debate inherent in the first amend-
ment, their simultaneous occurrence in one paper can be devastating. A
monopoly-chain newspaper could be both the sole conduit of information
and the chief architect of opinion, all the while promoting that political
persuasion favored by an alien editor, and ignoring any opposition promi-
nent enough to have reached the attention of a corporate office miles
away. Moreover, such a scenario appears to be the rule rather than the
exception.21
Accepting arguendo this portrait of the newspaper power structure,
as the Court did,-2 it nonetheless may depict too gloomy a picture, for it
places daily newspapers in a vacuum wholly devoid of other means of
spreading information and ideas. Perhaps a more realistic view of the
availability of media is that presented by Dr. Raymond Nixon of the
University of Minnesota. His survey reveals that, while over 1,500 cities
have daily newspaper service, 1,298 of these also have "competing media
17 TwENTmETH CENTURY FUND, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE REPORT OR
A NATIONAL NEws COUNCIL, A FREE AND RESPONSIVE PRESS 4 (1973).
18 Where one paper has a monopoly in an area, it seldom presents two sides of an issue.
It too often hammers away on one ideological or political line using its monopoly
position not to educate people, not to promote debate, but to inculcate its readers with
one philosophy, one attitude-and to make money.
Douglas, The Bill of Rights Is Not Enough in THE GREAT RIGHTs 124-25 (Ei. Cahn ed. 1963).
1 9 B. BAGDIKiAN, THE INFORMATION MACHINES 127 (1971).
20 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
21 See note 16 supra.
2294 S.Cr. at 2838.
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voices," i.e., separately owned media outlets such as radio and television
stations, weeklies, and magazines. In all, these "competing media voices"
outnumber the dailies with which they compete by a ratio of nearly four
to one."3  Such an overwhelming numerical advantage should assure
every advocate at least some vehicle for his views. As Mr. Justice Doug-
las pointed out in his concurring opinion in Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, "for one publisher who
may suppress a fact, there are many who will print it."-4
Nonetheless, where such an environment of media control exists, as it
does in the field of daily newspapers, access advocates contend that the
preservation of an effective right of expression demands of the press some
sort of enforceable obligation to responsibly present all facets of a public
issue. One prominent playwright and journalist has suggested that the
printed media is a public trust:
Freedom of the press is a right belonging, like all rights in a democracy,
to all the people. As a practical matter, however, it can be exercised
only by those who have effective access to the press. Where financial,
economic, and technological conditions limit such access to a small mi-
nority, the exercise of that right by that minority takes on fiduciary or
quasi-fiduciary characteristics. 2-
Others, such as Professor Jerome Barron of George Washington Uni-
versity, believe that the first amendment demands access itself, not just
representation dictated by the self-determined discretion of editors: "A
realistic view of the first amendment requires recognition that a right of
expression is somewhat thin if it can be exercised only at the sufferance
of the managers of mass communications."2' Moreover, access must be
an absolute right; even the limited access imposed upon the broadcasting
media by the "fairness doctrine" has left enough control in the owners
of the stations to abnegate freedom of expression in certain instances. "T
-However, as Professor Barron notes, "[O ur constitutional law has
been singularly indifferent to the reality and implications of non-govern-
2 3 Nixon, Trends in US. Newspaper Ownership: Concentration with Competition, 14 GA-
Z-rTE 181 (1968).
24412 U.S. 94, 153 (1973).
25,A. MacLeish in W. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 99 nA (1947). The trust
analogy has been frequently used with reference to broadcast frequencies. See, e.g., Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
2 6 Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L REV. 1641,
1648 (1967).
27 Barron, Aicess-The Onl) Choice for the Media, 48 TEX. L. REV. 766, 769-70 (1970).
As if to underscore this contention, it has been held recently that broadcasters have discretion
in the details of implementing their obligations under the "fairness doctrine." Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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mental obstructions to the spread of political truth."' ' Such "indifference"
is probably traceable to the structure of the press at the time of the adop-
tion of the first amendment. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, entry into the publishing business was relatively unencumbered
by economic and technological barriers. What is more, alternatives to
newspapers, as we have come to know them, abounded..29  The choice
was made between the risk that some would abuse the unfettered free-
dom to publish and a more obnoxious danger of government censorship
and controlY0 Thus, the choice between a free press and a fair press
had been made long before Tornillo came up for decision: "A respon-
sible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not
mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be
legislated."13
B. The Commercial Advertising Cases
The bulk of the precedents dealing directly with the compulsory
publication issue have involved a newspaper's refusal to print tendered
commercial advertising at the advertiser's expense. In only one decision
to date, Uhlman v. Sherman,3" has a court granted injunctive relief in aid
of publication. Although Uhlman can be distinguished on its facts,88
other courts that have discussed the case have chosen to characterize its
holding as an anomalous minority rule and have rejected it as such.8 4
Ironically, however, most of the advertising-rejection cases have relied
upon fourteenth amendment liberty of contract considerations rather
than upon the first amendment rationale enunciated in Tornillo. To re-
quire a newspaper to enter into a contract to print advertising would in-
fringe upon liberty, for
2 8 Barron, supra note 26, at 1643.
29 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 2835 (1974):
Entry into publishing was inexpensive; pamphlets and books provided meaningful
alternatives to the organized press for the expression of unpopular ideas and often
treated events and expressed views not covered by conventional newspapers. A true
marketplace of ideas existed in which there was relatively easy access to the channels
of communication.
3 0 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm, 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973).
31 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 2839 (1974).
3222 Ohio N.P.(n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. 1919).
a3 The action was brought by Uhlman against the newspaper publisher and three of Uhl-
man's business competitors. In seeking injunctive relief, the plaintiff alleged that the three
competitors had induced the newspaper, through the publi.her, to zeject Uhlman's proffered ad.
vertisements, thus giving the competitors a business advantage. 22 Ohio N. P. (n's.) at 225.26,
31 Ohio Dec. at 54. As such, the case contains elements of unfair trade practices and boycott
not to be found in other instances of advertisement rejection.
3 4 See, e.g., Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 5 Mich. App. 74, 145 N.W.2d 800 (1966),
aff'd mem., 380 Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d 421 (1968).
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the refusal to maintain trade relations with any individual is an inherent
right which every person may exercise lawfully, for reasons he deems
sufficient or for no reasons whatever, and it is immaterial whether such
refusal is based upon reason or is the result of mere caprice, prejudice or
malice. It is a part of the liberty of action which the Constitutions,
State and Federal, guarantee to the citizen3 5
Only in more recent cases have the courts begun to treat the problem
as one of restriction upon the media's first amendment freedom. In this
respect, courts have become accustomed to dealing with prior restraint
upon the press; statutes permitting such restraint prior to publication are
presumed unconstitutional unless the infringement is justified by a "clear
and present danger" to a vital public interest.3 Compulsory publication
has merited similar treatment:
There is no difference between compelling publication of material that the
newspaper wishes not to print and prohibiting a newspaper from print-
ing news or other material.37
'While, as mentioned, most of the cases in the area have involved
commercial advertising, the aversion to compulsory publication has not
been limited thereto. The aversion has been extended to almost all in-
stances in which a party pays a newspaper to publish the material sub-
mitted to it. It has been held that a newspaper may not be required to
print either political advertisements38 or legal notices 0 when the news-
paper does not bear the cost of publication.
Concededly, the material involved in Tornillo would not generally
be considered advertising; 40 nor was the cost of publication to be borne
by an outside party. These distinctions do not, however, serve to place
the situation in Tornillo outside the scope of the advertising precedents.
Instead, the characterization of Tornillo's reply as an element in the ex-
change of political ideas places it even further from the grasp of compul-
3 5 Poughkeepsie Buying Serv., Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 205 Misc. 982, 984,
131 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (Sup. Ct. 1954). See also Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa
1276, 247 N.W. 813 (1933).
36 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The first amendment and the "dear
and present danger" criteria were made applicable to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925). Applications of the test abound. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
1 (1949) (ordinance prohibiting publications causing breach of the peace); Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (registration of labor organizers).
3 7 Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1971). See
also Chicago Joint Bd., Aral. Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
38 Chronide & Gazette Publishing Co. v. Attorney General, 94 N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478
(1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 690, reb. denied, 329 U.S. 835 (1947).
39, Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript Co., 249 Mass. 477, 144 N.E. 400 (1924).
40 See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIoN 414 (1970); Note, Free-
dor of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L REV. 1191, 1192, 1195 (1965).
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sory publication. Commercial advertising enjoys only limited first amend-
ment protection: while its publication may be neither unduly restrained
nor compelled, it is, nonetheless, subject to regulation.41 Political expres-
sion, on the other hand, "enjoys the fullest protection of the first amend-
ment."42  In that the full protection granted political expression encom-
passes that limited protection afforded commercial print, political expres-
sion, like commercial print, also may not be printed by order of the gov-
ernment. Indeed, this is the conclusion reached in Tornillo.
C. The Newspaper Antitrust Cases
Access proponents have long looked to the antitrust cases involving
newspapers for support of their argument that the first amendment does
not sanction non-governmental restraint upon the exercise of free expres-
sion. 3 In particular, the following language from Associated Press v,
United States14 has been all but the keystone of their theory:
Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free
flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge
if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom,
Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom
to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to
keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from govern-
mental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction re-
pression of that freedom by private interests.
Taken by itself, the emphasized language would seem to support the
access position. However, Associated Press's pronouncement is applica-
ble only in certain limited instances which rarely appear in the case of
one seeking access to express political views.' 5 Moreover, a media mo-
nopoly by itself would be insufficient to invoke the implementation of
this command;" what must be present is a combination or attempted
combination with the purpose of monopolizing or restraining.47 Not only
4t Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
42 United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972).
43 Barron, supra note 26, at 1654.
44 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (emphasis supplied).
45 Three of the more prominent ca'es in the area involved refusals to accept commercial
advertising from merchants also advertising through other media outlets. Citizen Publishing
Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Lorain Journal Co. v. United S:ates, 342 U.S. 143
(1951); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cart, denied, 354 U.S.
923 (1957). Associated Press involved wire service sub:cripticn and only incidentally political
expression.
46 "[T]hough a particular newspaper may enjoy a virtual monopoly in the area of its pub.
lication, this fact is neither unusual nor of important significance." Approved Personnel, Ite,
v. Tribune Co., 177 So.2d 704, 706 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965).
47 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1972).
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does Associated Press point this out, but the requirement was made quite
explicit in Lorain Journal Co. r. United States:
"In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufac-
turer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." (emphasis
supplied) 48
It may become increasingly difficult to demonstrate such a purpose on the
part of a monopoly newspaper. Congress seems to have taken legislative
notice of the fact that many newspaper monopolies and chains have been
brought about by economic conditions rather than by any conscious in-
tent to monopolize communications and has passed the Newspaper Pres-
ervation Act,49 granting limited immunity from the antitrust laws to
"joint operating agreements" between newspapers.50
If, however, a combination to restrain the exercise of first amendment
freedoms could be shown, and if that combination was not protected
by the Newspaper Preservation Act, it is doubtful that the antitrust laws
would go as far as the access theory demands. In addition to limiting
its application to antitrust situations, Associated Press restricted the
scope of relief available under the Sherman Act: the decree did "not
compel AP or its members to permit publication of anything which their
Ireason' tells them should not be published.""I Thus, an antitrust decree
would still vest substantial discretion in the editor, and that discretion
would abnegate at least Professor Barron's concept of a right of access. -52
Moreover, it was precisely this language that Chief Justice Burger used
to distinguish Associated Press and the other newspaper antitrust cases
from the situation presented in Tornillo.
D. Access Under State Action
In those instances where the instrumentality of public communica-
tion has been operated by or under the control of the government, what
at first appears to be an unqualified right of access has been recognized.
Even the limitations placed on such a supposed right by Lehman v. City
48342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951) (quoting from United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,
307 (1919)).
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1970).
1"0 The joint operating agreement between The Miami Herald and The Afiaaix News has
been noted as one of those protected by the act. 116 CONG. REc. 1783 (1970).
ril 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945).
5- See text accompanying notes 26 and 27 supra. See also discussion of editorial discre-
tion at III infra.
m 94 S.Ct. at 2838-39.
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of Shaker Heights," involving advertising on public vehicles, would
not appear to appreciably vitiate an obligation to provide access to tra-
ditional channels of communication owned by the state. Indeed, Wolin
v. Port of New 'ork Authority,n5 involving the distribution of anti-war
leaflets in a state-owned bus terminal, seems to have anticipated the
holding in Lehman. Judge Kaufman, writing the opinion on appeal in
Wolin, makes a cogent argument concerning the appropriateness of the
terminal as a forum for the dissemination of political ideas, concluding
with the following test:
The propriety of a place for use as a public forum does turn on the rele-
vance of the premises to the protest, but this relation may be found in
two ways. -In some situations, the place represents the object of the pro-
test .... In other situations, the place is where the relevant audience may
be found.50
In that the relevant audience sought i.e., servicemen, could be readily
found in a bus terminal, Wfolin found that the terminal was an appropri-
ate first amendment forum. Other state action access cases, however, do
not venture so close to the perimeter now established by the Lehman fo-
rum rule.
Particularly in point are those cases involving high school and state
college operated newspapers. In both Zucker v. Panitz7 and Lee v.
Board of Regents of State Colleges,58 students sought to place paid ad-
vertising protesting the Vietnam War in school newspapers. School
authorities refused to allow publication, citing regulations prohibiting the
printing of such "controversial" material. However, having first found
that the school newspapers were .true" newspapers, not just instructional
laboratories, the district courts in both cases held that the regulations re-
lied upon by the school authorities were prohibited prior restraints upon
the press by the government. Such holdings illustrate the major feature
of state action access cases that significantly qualifies their use in support
of the access theory generally. The "right of access" supported therein is
not a positive right, rather, it evolves as a result of the application of
traditional first amendment considerations of governmental abridgment
5' 94 S.Cr. 2714 (1974). The refusal of a city and its agent, Metromedia, Inc., to sell ad-
vertising card space on the side of public transportation to a political candidate was upheld,
even though such card space was regularly sold to commercial advertisers. The Court, in a
5-4 decision, held that the side of public transportation was not a protected first amendment
forum.
'-1268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 196"), aft'd, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968).
5 392 F.2d at 90.
5 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
58306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
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of press freedom. Zucker, especially, explains that the access upheld
flows directly from the state's involvement and that the situation pre-
sented in it is wholly different than would be one involving privately-
owned media.39
The state action involved in Tornillo has just the opposite effect as
that involved in Zucker and Lee: it seeks to affirmatively require access
rather than to prohibit it. It retains, nonetheless, the character of pro-
scribed governmental intervention into the operations of media: "The
Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or
regulation forbidding appellant from publishing specified matter."G. As
such, Tornillo represents the other side of the same coin involved in those
state action cases to which access advocates have, in the past, looked for
support: state action can be used neither to aid nor to hinder access.
Tornillo may cause access proponents to shift their emphasis from the
creation of a positive right of access-i.e., expanding the duty owed by
media to the public-to the restriction of the ability of the press, as a pub-
lic servant, to deny discretionary access. Professor Barron seems already
to have suggested a means of achieving such a result:
If such facilities [private media], even though privately sponsored, are
also "dedicated to a public use," then presumably the same affirmative
obligations are placed on those facilities [as on government-owned facili-
ties]. The blurring of what is "private" and what is "public," which has
come to characterize so much of our life, eventually may create an access-
oriented approach to first amendment values which will endow any
natural or obvious forum in our society with responsibilities for stimu-
lating the communication of ideas. 1
Instead of attempting to derive a right to access from such cases as
Wolin, Zucker and Lee, the tactic may now be to construe media refusal
to grant access to be state action under the public function doctrine.62
The concepts of "public" and "private," however, will have to be-
come considerably more "blurred" before newspapers can be considered
to be performing government-like functions. Associated Press v. United
States has already explicitly declared that the business of publishing
newspapers is a wholly private enterprise, not a public utility.3 More-
59 See 299 F. Supp. at 104, 105 nA.
60 94 S.Ct. at 2839.
'" Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media., 37 GEO. WASH.
L REv. 487, 494 (1969).
62 The public function doctrine was first announced in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946). In essence, it states that government-like activities carried on by private entities in
lieu of performance by government of the same function is state action and is subject to state
regulation.
G3 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945).
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
over, the nature of the activity carried on by a newspaper provides a com-
pelling reason for doubting whether newspapers will ever be encom-
passed by the public function doctrine. "[T]he historic function of
newspapers, like the pamphlets of a prior day, has been to oppose gov-
ernment, to be its critic, not its accomplice." '4  Since the press acts as a
critic of, and watchdog over, government, its effectiveness in this role and,
consequently, the public interest "demands that the press shall remain
independent, unfettered by governmental regulation."05  Moreover, this
same reasoning precludes attempts to impute state action to a private
newspaiper because of co-operation between it and the government in
limited areas.60 As Mr. Justice Stewart has pointed out, such imputation
belies the separation of media and state inherent in the first amendment."7
Indeed, it would appear that, in the case of newspapers, the blurring antic-
ipated by Professor Barron has not yet begun: newspapers are by orga-
nization, nature, function and constitutional decree entirely distinct entities
from those which could be characterized as public.
E. The Chilling Effect
One of the purposes of a right of reply statute, and the one discussed
by the Florida Supreme Court in its consideration of Tornillo, "is to make
newspapers ... serve as better instrumentalities for the dissemination of
conflicting and divergent points of view.""8  The statute purported to
achieve this goal by requiring the publishing of subject-drafted responses
to media criticism of candidates. Such replies were seen as the oppor-
tunity to present defense and refutation in the same forum and before
the same audience as the attack. The real effect of such a statute, as
Chief Justice Burger noted, could be that, "under the operation of the
Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or re-
duced,"" thus lessening the play of discussion rather than broadening it.
64 Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (D. Colo. 1971).
The expos6 of the Waterga'e affair by the 1Washington Post dtmonstrates the substance of
such a proposition.
65 Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 5 Mich. App. "14, 84, 145 N.W.2d 800. 804 (1966).
6 The leading cases involving the imputation of state action to private concerns engaged in
joint ventures with the government, as in Bur:on v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US.
715 (1961), are examined and found inapplicable to newspapers in Chicago Joint Bd., Aral.
Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co,, 435 F.2d 470 ("th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973
(1971).
67 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 133 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring): "This is a step a!ong a path that could eventually lead to the propo-
sition that private newspapers 'are' Government. Freedom of the press would then be gone."
68 Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA, L. REV.
867, 896 (1948). Cf. Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errorr in the Press, 60 HARV, L.
REV. 1, 26 (1946).
09 94 S.Ct. at 2839. See also T. EMERSON, supra note 40, at 671.
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The operation of the statute involved in Tornillo, § 104.38, had to be
"triggered" by the initiative of the newspaper. Indeed, the statute em-
bodied an implicit assumption that the newspaper would exercise that ini-
tiative by commenting on candidates for public office. Nonetheless, the
existence of such a statute militated against editorial commentary, for
it subjected the newspaper to involuntary burdens once the comment had
been made. It subjected the publishers to a type of "retribution solely be-
cause of what they [chose] to think and publish.""
This retribution could have taken one of two forms: the newspaper
might have undertaken the burden of printing the replies. Such a
course would have involved considerable time and expense, as the Court
noted,7 1 and could potentially tie up a great deal of space on the pages of
any one issue.72 On the other hand, the newspaper might have refused
to comply, thereby subjecting itself to criminal sanctions. Faced with such
a dilemma, "with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that
published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right of
access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid
controversy .... The editor might very likely have chosen to abdicate
both his responsibility to the public and his own first amendment right by
refraining from making any initial comment at all. As Judge J. Skelly
Wright put it, in lIashington Post Co. v. Keogh:
Unless persons, including newspapers, desiring to exercise their First
Amendment rights are assured freedom from the harassment of lawsuits,
they will tend to become self-censors. And to this extent debate on
public issues and the conduct of public officials will become less unin-
hibited, less robust, and less wide open .... 4
Arguably, the harassment and self-censorial impact of a criminal statute,
such as the one involved in Tornillo, is even greater than that of a libel
suit, as was involved in Keogh. Nonetheless, the self-censorial aspect is
present, for only by censoring its own remarks vis-a-vis candidates could
a newspaper escape the dilemma of increased costs or statutory penalty.
Moreover, the dilemma forcing abstention from comment would exist
even if the likelihood of the eventual imposition of the sanction was
minimal.7" Neither the laxity of enforcement nor the absence of success
70 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1960) (arlan, J.). "The Florida
statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper." Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S.Ct. at 2839.
7194 S.Ct. at 2839.
-
2 Daniel, Right of Access to Afass Media-Government Obligation to Enforce First
Amendment?, 48 TEx. L. REv. 783, 785 (1970).
, 94 S.Ct. at 2839.
74 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
-5 Since its adoption in 1913, the Florida right of reply statute has been the basis for legal
1974] NOTES
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
in prosecution removes the discouragement, the "chilling effect," caused
by the statute's mere existence:
The very possibility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and
protracted process, is threat enough to cause discussion and debate to
"steer far wider of the unlawful zone," thereby keeping protected dis-
cussion from public cognizance.76
If the "chilling effect" caused by the dilemma presented by the stat-
ute results in the press's withdrawal from political commentary, the oper-
ation of the statute would not be "triggered." Not only would the pub-
lic be denied the opportunity to read the candidate's reply, but any ini-
tiating commentary would be silenced as well. Rather than expand the
spectrum of viewpoints presented, the Florida statute struck down in
Tornillo would have narrowed it to the point of non-existence. This
muting of responsible political criticism would do more than just dampen
the vigor and limit the variety of public debate;" it would have had the
potential to eliminate it from newspapers entirely.
IV. THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEWSPAPER FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
While Tornillo holds that a newspaper may not be required to print
specific material, it leaves open for all practical purposes, the question of
whether the government might, in the future, impose upon the press a
general obligation to exercise some sort of balance in the presentation of
material on important public issues. Not only is the constitutionality of
the application of something analogous to the "Fairness Doctrine" to
newspapers left unresolved, but it also appears that the first cautious steps
may have been taken in clearing away barriers to such a statute. The
Court's dissatisfaction with the tendency toward one-sided reporting, 8 its
use of the editorial discretion argument, its discussion of the real and prac-
tical limitations on the expansion of the number of newspapers and news-
paper space, and the striking absence of any reference whatever to Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,"h taken individually, might not indicate
any significant development. However, when taken together, these ele-
ments lay an excellent foundation for the expansion of the "Fairness
Doctrine" to newspapers.
action only once, other than Tornillo. In State v. News-Journal Corp., 36 Fla. Supp. 164
(Volusia County J. C. 1972), as in the initial decision in Tornillo, the statute was found tc
be unconstitutionally restrictive of a free press.
7, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971) (emphasis supplied).
'
7 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,.94 S.Ct. at 2839 (quoting from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
78 See text at III A, supra.
79 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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At the outset, the term "Fairness Doctrine" must be defined, and dis-
tinguished from, the equal time rule. The "Fairness Doctrine" has evolved
as a result of FCC case law interpretation of the "public interest" licens-
ing standard of the Communications Act of 1934.80 Its essential ele-
ments dictate that broadcast licensees provide adequate coverage of con-
troversial issues of public importance,"' that such coverage fairly present
all facets of the question, 2 and that such fair and adequate coverage be
undertaken at the broadcaster's expenses" and initiative"4 if no outside
party comes forth to make such presentation. The equal time rule is pri-
marily statutory in nature and is limited in its application to political can-
didates."5 Moreover, the opportunity for presenting opposing views un-
der the "Fairness Doctrine" need not meet the precise balancing of the
equal time rule; rather, "reasonable opportunity" is the governing stan-
dard."0 The philosophy behind the "Fairness Doctrine" was well ex-
pressed by Professor Meiklejohn: "What is essential is not that everyone
shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.""
It is readily apparent from the extensive discussion of the develop-
ment and effect of concentrated control of newspapers in Chief Justice
Burger's opinion,"8 that the Court feels that "everything worth saying"
may not be being said in the printed media. Though that medium may
adequately cover crucial public issues, there is some question as to whether
it does so fairly. And, in the case of "chain" newspapers, there are sig-
nificant doubts as to whether internal initiative alone is sufficient impetus
to get the whole story."'
The coverage by one printed medium may not measure up to the stan-
dard of even-handed coverage required of the electronic media. But be-
fore that standard is imposed upon newspapers, it should be determined
whether the printed press shares those characteristics of the radio and tele-
80 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
8 1 United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
82 New Broadcasting Co., 6 P.&F. Radio Reg. 258 (1970).
'- Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P.&F. Radio Reg. 895 (1963).
84 John J. Dempsey, 6 P.&F. Radio Reg. 615 (1950): Metropolitan Broadcasting Co., 19
P.&F. Radio Reg. 602 (1960).
85 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970). In brief, the statute requires
broadcasters to grant equal opportunities for candidates for a political office to use their facil-
ities, if any other candidate for the same office has been permitted to use the facilities. Exempted
from the operation of the rule are bona fide newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot news coverage.
NG Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 369 (1969).
87 A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1948).
88 94 S.Ct. at 2835-38.
89 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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vision media that required the establishment of a "Fairness Doctrine" in
the first place. It has been said that the necessity of a "Fairness Doc-
trine" lies in the peculiar nature of the airwaves, the broadcast frequen-
cies, the instrumentalities of that mode of journalism. In upholding the
constitutionality of the "Fairness Doctrine," the Court, in Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC0 noted that there was a limit to the number of broad-
cast frequencies available for use; not all who wish to may take to the air-
waves simultaneously. Therefore, regulation is permitted in order to as-
sure that the few who gain access to this scarce commodity through the
acquisition of a broadcast license do not abuse their right to use this re-
source. Freedom of speech and press is not abridged
by legislation directly or indirectly multiplying the voices and views pre-
sented to the public through time sharing, fairness doctrines, or other de-
vices which limit or dissipate the power of those who sit astride the chan-
nels of communication .... 91
Moreover, the Cullman doctrine, in requiring that contrasting views be
represented at the broadcaster's expense if proponents of such views,
cannot afford to buy air time,92 further assured that the multiplication of
such voices was not hindered by economic barriers.
Prior to Tornillo, however, the Supreme Court had always indicated
that, because newspapers did not have a physical limitation comparable
to the broadcast frequencies, a "Fairness Doctrine" was not applicable to
them. While this careat was only implied in Red Lion"3 it became quite
explicit in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee: "Unlike other media, broadcasting is subject to an inherent
physical limitation.'"'" Indeed, newspapers were seen as bounded only by
the economics of putting an issue on the streets."'
In Tornillo, however, the Court may have begun to retreat from this
position. While the economic limitation language of Columbia Broad-
casting was repeated,"'; language appearing later in. the opinion intimates
that that limitation may make newspaper space every bit the scarce re-
source that broadcast frequencies are considered to be:
90 395 U.S. 367, 390, 391 (1969).
91 Id. at 401 n.28.
92 Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P.&F. Radio Reg. 895 (1963); Columbia Broadcasting Sys,,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123-24 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
93395 U.S. at 386.
'4 412 U.S. at 101 (emphasis supplied).
95412 U.S. at 117.
96 94 S.Ct. at 2838.
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It is correct, as appellee contends, that a newspaper is not subject to the
finite technological limitations of time that confront a broadcaster but it is
not correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can proceed to
infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the replies that a
government agency determines or a statute commands the readers should
have available.97
Not only is space in existing newspapers limited, but the possibility of
creating more column space by establishing more newspapers is slim;
the Court recognized that entry into the newspaper market is all but im-
possible today.?8 Thus, parallels between air time and column space, be-
tween the number of frequencies and the number of newspapers, seem
to emerge from Tornillo. At the same time, the earlier limitations on
the applicability of a "Fairness Doctrine" to newspapers, found in Red
Lion and Columbia Broadcasting are not repeated. Indeed, Red Lion is
not even mentioned in the opinion, and its absence is particularly strik-
ing due to the Florida supreme court's reliance upon it.
Upon first reading, the brief discussion of the role of editorial discre-
tion in Tornillo would seem to have little bearing upon the propriety of
a "Fairness Doctrine" for newspapers. The exercise of freedom of choice
over what will and will not go into a newspaper has long been regarded
as an integral part of, and implicit in, a free press.' Reaffirming such a
stance, in fact, may be all that the Court, in Tornillo, intended. Yet, giv-
en the retreat from the strict broadcast-newspaper dichotomy, the edi-
torial discretion language may refer to something more; it may be a fur-
ther signal that the Court is prepared to consider a "Fairness Doctrine"
for the printed media.
The concept of broadcaster judgment has long been an integral part
of the "Fairness Doctrine." In the implementation of the policy, the in-
dividual broadcaster
is called upon to make reasonable judgments in good faith on the facts of
each situation-as to whether a controversial issue of public importance
is involved, as to what viewpoints have been or should be presented, as
to the format and spokesmen to present the viewpoints, and all the other
facets of such programming.100
97 Id. at 2839.
98 Id. at 2836.
99 See, e.g., Associated Prefs v. United States. 326 U.S. 1, 20 --18 (1945), declaring that
the antitrust decree was not to interfere with editorial discretion ("reason"). See also Colunm.
bia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973), ascribing
broader discretion to newspapers than to broadcasters.
101 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964). See also Letter to Mid-Florida Television Corp., 40
F.C.C. 620, 621 (1964).
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This broad power over the implementation of the "Fairness Doctrine"
has been repeatedly upheld in the courts.' Moreover, as an incident of
this discretion, the broadcaster has the power to refuse to sell airtime to
proponents of contrasting points of view, so long as the general edict of
the "Fairness Doctrine" is complied with. e'02
Because of the editor's discretion, the "Fairness Doctrine" differs from
a right of access. Indeed, Congress expressly rejected the idea of an ac-
cess doctrine in enacting the Communications Act of 1934.101 The limi-
tations of time and frequency availability would make an access doctrine
unworkable; rather, the broadcaster was given the power to select spokes-
men and presentations to be part of the station's programming and to
represent those of similar persuasion." 4 The "Fairness Doctrine" is,
therefore, a compromise between the impossibility of total access and the
threat of a broadcaster-imposed "gag" on opposition views.
If the Court in Tornillo perceives a threat of voices being silenced
by the newspaper industry, and if newspaper space is, indeed, a limited
commodity, a "Fairness Doctrine" allowing discretion in its implementa-
tion-a discretion similar to that now found in broadcasting-is not
ruled out by Tornillo's ban on access. On the contrary, it appears to be
encouraged. The enforcement of such a policy presents a major problem:
licensing, the enforcement mechanism for broadcasting, would be out of
the question as a prior restraint. It would seem, however, that such regu-
lation could be tied to advantages newspapers now receive in their busi-
ness operations-e.g., lower mail rates, shipment i:n interstate commerce,
and the limited antitrust immunity of the Newspaper Preservation Act'05
-without infringing on first amendment rights. Newspapers would be
at liberty to comply with the "Fairness Doctrine," but failure to comply
would result in curtailment of these benefits.""'  Because a "Fairness
Doctrine" would allow discretion in the manner of presentation of con-
trasting material, rather than the exactitude commanded by the right of
reply statute, no "penalty" of increased composing time or production
costs, which the Court alluded to in Tornillo, need be present. The
101 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Green v. FCC,
447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 842 (1969).
-'12 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (19"1).
10 3 Id. at 105, 110, 122.
104 Id. at 111.
If, 15 U.S.C. H§ 1801-04 ( 19-0).
206Cf. Belleville Advocate Printing Co. v. St. Clair County, 336 111. 359, 168 N.E, 312
(1929), holding that a newspaper could not be compelled to publish tax assessment lists, but
once it chose to do so, it was bound by the statutory advertising rate.
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newspaper would be free to develop fair treatment within its existing
format.
V. CONCLUSION
Tornillo's resolution of the compulsory publication issue was not un-
expected; indeed, it is but the latest instance of an ongoing aversion to
allowing governmental dictation of what will or will not go into a news-
paper. To allow such leverage over the press would, in all likelihood,
result in a less diverse press. Yet, the Court does not seem completely
satisfied with the conduct of the independent press to date. The lan-
guage of Tornillo evidences stirrings that may mark the beginnings of a
new approach toward achieving a balanced presentation of public is-
sues in the private press. Tornillo, in holding that government com-
mands to publish specific material are obnoxious to the first amendment,
has very likely been the death knell of the access doctrine; but, rising from
these ashes may be a more general requirement that the press treat public
issues in a more even-handed manner. Such balance may even be govern-
mentally induced without running afoul of the free press guarantee,
especially if editors are allowed a free hand in developing and imple-
menting the mechanics of that balance.
Frederick S. Coombs, III
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